Within 60 days of the most recent formal US or EU sanctions-relief announcement on Syria (approximately July 2026), at least one of the three specified banking-reintegration criteria will be publicly confirmed: parallel/official exchange rate convergence within 25%, multilateral institution re-engagement or preliminary assessment announcement, or major regional bank correspondent banking announcement with a Syrian state institution.

Step 1 — Base rate: Three directly comparable historical cases (Iran JCPOA, Cuba Obama-era, Myanmar 2012) yield an approximately 17% base rate for at least one criterion being met within 60 days. Myanmar is the only case with a plausible hit (World Bank engagement at ~8 weeks), but Myanmar retained functioning banking infrastructure throughout its political freeze — a qualitatively better starting position than Syria’s. Adjusted base rate toward 15-18%. Step 2 — Framework convergence on (a): All four frameworks independently conclude exchange-rate convergence within 25% is near-impossible within 60 days. This is the single highest-confidence signal in the analysis. P(a) ≈ 0.05. Step 3 — Framework divergence on (b): Keynesian (announcement-effect logic) is most optimistic (~0.30), Institutionalist most pessimistic (~0.08, arrears-clearance procedural block). Austrian knowledge-problem analysis and Marxist disciplinary-instrument reading both position (b) as conditional on Syrian state signaling willingness to accept IMF terms, which Gulf unconditional alternatives disincentivize. Synthesis P(b) ≈ 0.18-0.22, with the key uncertainty being whether definitional ambiguity allows informal consultation announcements to qualify. Step 4 — Framework divergence on (c): Marxist (transnational capital accumulation imperatives, 0.45) and Keynesian (political animal spirits, 0.35) are more optimistic than Austrian (entrepreneurial discovery with secondary-sanctions uncertainty, 0.28) and Institutionalist (first-mover collective action trap, 0.10). The critical asymmetry: Gulf state-directed banks operate under political mandate rather than purely commercial logic; a Saudi or UAE decision to absorb first-mover costs for geopolitical positioning breaks the waiting game the Institutionalist correctly identifies as the equilibrium among purely commercial actors. P(c) ≈ 0.22-0.28. Step 5 — Weighted synthesis: Applying tradition weights (Institutionalist 0.35, Marxist 0.25, Keynesian 0.25, Austrian 0.15) to each framework’s estimate for P(at least one criterion met): 0.35×0.15 + 0.25×0.58 + 0.25×0.52 + 0.15×0.42 = 0.053 + 0.145 + 0.130 + 0.063 = 0.391. Adjusted downward slightly to 0.38 given the Institutionalist’s higher confidence_in_confidence (0.72 vs. others’ 0.42-0.58) and the strength of the Iran precedent as the most structurally similar case. Step 6 — Confidence-in-confidence: Marked ‘low’ because the key swing variable — whether Gulf sovereign political logic overrides the first-mover commercial trap — is essentially a geopolitical judgment call not well-specified by any framework, and definitional ambiguity in criterion (b) creates genuine resolution uncertainty independent of underlying reality.