The NATO summit communiqué will NOT contain explicit language authorizing or endorsing Ukrainian use of alliance-supplied weapons to strike Russian territory beyond existing de facto permissions; it will iterate Bucharest-formula ambiguity with strengthened but non-codified self-defense language ('inherent right to self-defense including against launch-territory targets' or similar) rather than naming weapon systems, territories, or granting formal operational permission.

Base rate: explicit new operational authorizations in NATO communiqués for escalation-adjacent questions occur roughly 10% of the time (Bucharest 2008 MAP language is the exception, not the rule, and even that was explicitly watered down). Bayesian update from framework analysis: all four frameworks assign ~63–80% probability to ‘no explicit codification’ through independent causal chains (class-interest equilibrium, knowledge-aggregation impossibility, liquidity preference, path dependence / unanimity-rule veto). Four-framework convergence on the same binary outcome is a strong inter-framework correlation that pushes confidence above any single framework’s estimate. The institutionalist framework provides the most proximate causal mechanism — Hungary veto under unanimity rules requires zero coordination and is publicly signaled — warranting highest weighting. The Russian pre-summit strikes, which surface-level intuition might read as forcing a NATO response, are interpreted by three of four frameworks as reinforcing caution rather than demanding codification. Final estimate: 0.82 probability of ‘no explicit codification.’ The 0.18 residual accounts primarily for the de facto-to-formal pathway (existing bilateral permissions crystallizing into text) and the possibility of a shock event inside the summit window that collapses unanimity barriers.