Christine Lagarde will not formally announce her resignation from the ECB presidency by August 31, 2026. Secondary conditional claim: if a formal resignation announcement occurs before August 31, the ECB Governing Council will not signal a dovish policy pivot during the transition period — maintaining restrictive or neutral stance — with conditional probability 0.83.

Base rate from historical precedent: one mid-term ECB presidential departure in 28 years of institutional history (Duisenberg 2003), implying an annualized rate of approximately 3.5% — in the 58-day resolution window this produces a base-rate prior of roughly 4%. Framework evidence adjusts upward modestly: persistent rumor signal, active Lagarde signaling, and declining residual mandate value push departure probability to approximately 20–22%. All four frameworks independently converge on no formal announcement — Marxist via escrow optionality (ambiguity dominates formal announcement), Keynesian via structural incentives to remain through peak Q3 dovish-pressure, Austrian via subjective-value calculation favoring political option but timeline uncertainty, and Institutionalist via option-value retention requiring a concrete role first. Cross-framework convergence at 0.75–0.82 probability of non-announcement settles confidence at 0.79. The conditional no-dovish-pivot claim registers even higher convergence (0.82–0.88): the Marxist class-ideology amplification mechanism, Austrian price-signal forfeiture logic, and Institutionalist hawk-veto asymmetry all predict restriction independently; only the Keynesian framework notes the demand-destructive paradox but still predicts it will occur. Confidence is medium rather than high because the French political calendar is a genuine exogenous shock that none of the frameworks can fully model from public information.