By July 19, 2026, Iran's Assembly of Experts will have formally convened at least once AND either (a) publicly identified a frontrunner candidate for Supreme Leader or (b) formally activated an interim leadership arrangement under Article 111 or equivalent constitutional mechanism.

Step 1: All four frameworks converge on near-certain formal convening (implied probability >0.88 across frameworks). Step 2: The compound question requires convening AND some designation outcome. Step 3: The institutionalist framework introduces the pivotal variable — Article 111 interim council — which may be automatically operational on death, making ‘interim designation’ a lower-bar condition than naming a frontrunner. Step 4: If Article 111 activation counts as interim designation (the constitutional text supports this reading), the conditional probability of meeting condition (b) given convening rises substantially — to ~0.80-0.85. Step 5: The Keynesian paradox-of-thrift analysis provides the main downward pressure: formal meetings may occur without binding public commitment to a candidate. Step 6: The revenge-surge acts as an exogenous demand injection, asymmetrically raising the cost of inaction for the hardliner bloc and functioning as a Keynesian dominant-buyer catalyst. Step 7: Base rate from 1989 (~95% for convening, ~85% for some designation within 72 hours) is adjusted downward for: absent pre-consolidated successor, greater factional fragmentation, IRGC veto dynamics. Net adjustment from base: -0.10 to -0.13 on combined probability. Step 8: Final: P(convene) ~0.92 × P(some designation | convene) ~0.78 ≈ 0.72, with Article 111 automatic mechanism as the key upward-pushing variable.