By August 24, 2026, Venezuela's political crisis will not produce any of the three specified threshold events: Maduro will not be formally removed from office or step down voluntarily; no multilateral military or humanitarian intervention will be authorized by an international body; and fewer than five states, or no Latin American state among them, will formally recognize an opposition-led government as Venezuela's legitimate authority.

All four frameworks converge on the same directional prediction — none of the three threshold events will occur — though with varying self-assessed confidence (institutionalist 0.87, Marxist 0.73; Austrian 0.15 and Keynesian 0.18 reflect acknowledged blind spots rather than divergent directional claims). The convergence of four independent analytical frameworks on the same outcome is a high-confidence signal. The historical base rate for regime persistence in comparable 2-month windows for military-integrated patronage autocracies with active external backing is approximately 0.90. The frameworks adjust this downward slightly (to 0.82) due to shared blind spots: cascade nonlinearity in defection dynamics, intra-chavista factional opaqueness, and criminal-revenue resilience that is empirically unobservable. The primary mechanism that all frameworks implicitly agree on is the necessary-precondition structure: all three threshold events require military defection as a complementary condition, and the military’s constitutive (not derivative) material stake in the extraction network forecloses that condition within the window. The confidence-in-confidence is ‘medium’ rather than ‘high’ because the cascade blind spot is structural — it is precisely the kind of nonlinear event that equilibrium models systematically underweight, and the Venezuelan situation contains the elements (shrinking rents, factional pressure, death toll) that historically precede cascade inflection points even when those inflection points do not occur in the specific window.