By 2026-08-23, Venezuela will not experience a formal power-transition event — no resignation, successful military coup, or internationally recognized power-sharing agreement will occur under the Maduro government.

All four frameworks converge on the same prediction direction — no formal transition — through distinct but mutually reinforcing mechanisms. Base rate for formal transition in any 57-day window during sustained authoritarian crisis is approximately 4%. Framework analysis adjusts this strongly toward stability, not away from it. The Institutionalist framework receives the highest weight (0.36): its identification of criminal exposure as a qualitatively distinct switching cost — not reducible to income loss and not neutralizable by negotiated guarantees — is the most precise explanatory mechanism for why Venezuelan military defection is structurally harder than in prior analogues like Romania 1989. The Marxist framework (0.30) independently confirms: the military-as-class-actor analysis means Maduro’s removal would not automatically constitute regime transition if the extraction structure persists, making the question itself more demanding than it appears. The Austrian rent-distribution mechanism (0.22) provides a third independent confirmation through the loyalty-pricing logic, while identifying dollarization as the non-obvious stabilizing variable. The Keynesian framework (0.12) is assigned lowest weight because its own confidence (0.18) signals the framework recognizes it lacks clean predictive traction on coup-threshold dynamics — this low confidence is correctly treated as methodological self-limitation rather than evidence of transition probability. The 57-day horizon is the synthesis’s hardest constraint: preference cascades, stock-depletion processes, and external-patron recalculation all operate on longer timescales. Final estimate: 0.87 probability that no formal transition occurs by 2026-08-23.