By 2026-07-10, DHS will publicly announce and/or execute at least one documented deportation removal flight specifically designated as targeting Haitian TPS holders; Syrian-specific removal flights will not execute within this window due to diplomatic-infrastructural infeasibility.

The SCOTUS ruling creates a legal discontinuity that all four frameworks agree triggers rapid announcement action. The OR condition in the question substantially lowers the resolution threshold — announcement is nearly costless and yields maximum political dividend. The Marxist deportability-as-discipline mechanism explains why announcement achieves the primary objective without requiring execution: the threat itself performs the labor-suppression function. The Austrian rent-competition analysis explains the speed: eliminated legal constraint triggers immediate entrepreneurial discovery by enforcement actors who had been waiting for legal clearance. The institutionalist historical record from 2017-2018 confirms announcement-to-execution lags of months, not days — but this does not suppress the YES outcome if announcement suffices. The Keynesian operational bottleneck analysis correctly identifies why execution will lag, but is the framework least suited to model the signaling-theater function of immigration enforcement under this administration. The critical asymmetry is by nationality: Haitian flights have existing bilateral removal infrastructure, making at least one documented flight operationally feasible within 14 days; Syrian flights are structurally infeasible given zero diplomatic infrastructure, no functioning receiving government, and no bilateral removal agreement. Base rate of ~0.80 for announcement-level action following a major permissive SCOTUS ruling on enforcement, adjusted down to 0.78 for: (a) judicial emergency stay risk within the window, (b) Haiti reception-capacity degradation, (c) possibility the administration treats the ruling itself as sufficient coalition signal without operational follow-through.