By August 15, 2026, the EU will NOT formally impose a new round of Iran sanctions that structurally diverges from the US position. It will issue differentiated conditionality language (particularly demanding IRGC restraint or Lebanon compliance guarantees the US has not formally required), but will stop short of formal CFSP adoption of measures that are stricter in scope, independently timed, or explicitly triggered by conditions outside the US deal framework.

All four frameworks converge on the same directional prediction (no formal structural divergence) through independent causal chains, which is a strong convergent signal. The marxist framework identifies the legitimation imperative that creates pressure for symbolic divergence but ceiling from dollar-hegemony; the Austrian framework identifies the dollar-system price signal that enforces convergence at the firm level regardless of EU institutional decisions; the keynesian framework identifies political liquidity preference under fundamental uncertainty as the mechanism for deferral; the institutionalist framework adds the decisive procedural constraint — CFSP unanimity on a sub-3-month timeline is historically implausible. The base rate for this kind of explicit EU-US structural divergence on Iran is approximately 15% for any given 2-month window, drawing on the INSTEX and Blocking Statute precedents where formal divergence was achieved but material divergence collapsed. The framework analyses all push downward from this base rate, primarily through the dollar-system constraint (Austrian/Marxist), the unanimity-plus-timeline problem (Institutionalist), and political liquidity preference (Keynesian). The only meaningful upward pressure comes from the conditionality axis: if the EU formalizes any restrictive measure — even targeted asset freezes — explicitly conditioned on IRGC restraint or Lebanon guarantees not demanded by the US, this resolves YES. This is the most plausible path to YES and is captured in the falsification criteria. Net adjustment from base rate: downward to approximately 0.22 YES probability, or 0.78 NO. Confidence in confidence is medium because the disjunctive definition of the question (any of three forms of divergence suffices) and the targeted-instrument pathway create genuine ambiguity about whether partial conditionality measures would satisfy the criteria.