The EU Council summit (June 26–27, 2026) will produce neither (a) a formal suspension or lifting of Iran sanctions aligned with the US 'unconditional surrender' framing, nor (b) a formal EU dissenting statement on Israel that operationalizes the Kallas 'apartheid' characterization into actionable CFSP policy. The summit communiqué will use deliberately ambiguous language on both tracks — acknowledging divergence without operationalizing it.

All four frameworks converge on the null outcome despite using entirely different mechanisms. Marxist: material interests in dollar-denominated financial architecture outweigh Iran market access incentives; defense-industrial stakes constrain Israel dissent; the legitimacy-maintenance function of the EU foreign policy apparatus produces process-currency rather than binding policy under multi-fraction deadlock. Austrian: 27-way knowledge problem under CFSP unanimity cannot aggregate contested foreign policy signals into a decisive output; US binary framing destroys the marginal information EU actors need for incremental adjustment; deliberate ambiguity is the spontaneous equilibrium that satisfies veto-holders without requiring preference resolution. Keynesian: fundamental uncertainty triggers convention-following behavior; the paradox of diplomatic thrift produces collectively demand-deficient foreign policy output even when each member state individually recognizes the cost; Minsky Ponzi-deference makes autonomous EU movement structurally costly to initiate. Institutionalist: CFSP veto-point lattice filters output to unanimity threshold; path dependence creates institutional precedent costs that resist US framing self-subordination; switching cost asymmetry blocks formal dissent; second-order governance failure (no credible enforcement mechanism) reduces the value of formal positions to veto-holders who can defect costlessly. The convergence is unusually strong across ideologically opposed frameworks. The Keynesian framework’s lower confidence (0.41) is the only dissenting signal, reflecting real but insufficient industrial demand pressure — and even Keynesian predicts gesture-divergence, not formal threshold-crossing. Historical precedent is unambiguous: EU absorbed the 2003 Iraq split, the 2018 JCPOA withdrawal, and the decade-long China arms embargo coordination failure through deliberate ambiguity in every case. The specific binary thresholds in the question are set high enough that the EU’s characteristic gesture-divergence output will not clear them.