No EU collective instrument — Council conclusions, formal CFSP declaration with binding effect, or formal initiation of EU-Israel Association Agreement Article 2 suspension proceedings — conditioning or restricting arms transfers or trade benefits to Israel on rights grounds will be adopted by 2026-08-14.

Base rate is derived from the structural fact that the EU has never formally activated Article 2 conditionality in 25 years across multiple analogous situations — setting an approximately 8% prior on collective action emerging in any given 2-month window. All four frameworks independently converge on ‘no collective action,’ with confidences ranging from 0.68 (Keynesian) to 0.81 (Institutionalist), averaging 0.76. The cross-framework convergence on the same prediction direction is a strong signal that warrants adjusting the confidence upward from the raw average toward 0.83, with the remaining uncertainty attributable to: (1) the Keynesian framework’s legitimate identification of exogenous shock vulnerability — a mass casualty event could temporarily coordinate expectations across the blocking coalition; (2) the Austrian framework’s acknowledgment that Germany may be blocked by constraint rather than preference, making it more movable than the veto analysis implies; (3) the possibility of a QMV-routed trade instrument that bypasses CFSP unanimity — which none of the frameworks adequately models. The tradition weights favor Institutionalist analysis because it identifies the most mechanically precise veto mechanism (Article 2’s 25-year non-activation), the most directly comparable historical precedent (Khashoggi), and the transaction-cost logic that explains why even well-intentioned coalitions fail to coordinate. Marxist analysis contributes the seigniorage mechanism — the EU produces declaratory output that occupies the evidentiary channel and makes inaction legible as activity, which is the mechanism most likely to sustain the stable equilibrium through the prediction window. The Keynesian contribution (paradox of thrift in political capital) explains the aggregate outcome from individual rationality without requiring conspiracy or bad faith. The Austrian contribution (dispersed knowledge, spontaneous order) explains why decentralized national-level actions are already the equilibrium substitute for collective instruments, reducing the pressure for coordination.