Israel will conduct at least one direct kinetic strike on Iranian territory (not proxy forces, not Syrian/Lebanese soil) between June 9 and June 23, 2026.

Base rate for direct Israeli strike on Iranian territory in any given 14-day window, absent specific triggering indicators, is approximately 0.22 (derived from 2 confirmed direct exchanges in a ~365-day post-April-2024 window, plus low prior probability before that normalization). This base rate is then adjusted upward by three converging signals: (1) specific credible reports of Netanyahu ordering strike preparations — not generic elevated tension — raise the prior substantially; (2) three of four frameworks assign >50% probability, with Marxist and Keynesian reaching 0.62-0.63 on independent mechanisms (coalition survival, animal spirits cascade); (3) the Institutionalist framework identifies that the April 2024 normalization has already paid the precedent-setting cost, reducing the institutional inhibition for a second crossing. The primary dampener is the US veto institution — but the Institutionalist framework’s key insight is that the US claim is only operative if backed by tangible leverage (weapons holds, intelligence blackouts), which is not currently publicly observable. Austrian uncertainty about Netanyahu’s subjective cost calculus and IDF institutional conservatism further widen the confidence interval. Synthesis: base rate 0.22, adjusted to approximately 0.57 given the specific preparation reports and multi-framework convergence on mechanisms favoring action. The gap between base rate and final estimate reflects the quality of the specific trigger signal; the gap between 0.57 and certainty reflects the genuine operationality question on US enforcement.