The US Senate will NOT pass the Ukraine aid bill (House-passed June 4, 2026) by June 18, 2026; the bill will fail to receive a floor vote or fail cloture within the 14-day window.

All four frameworks converge on non-passage by June 18, though through distinct causal pathways. The institutionalist analysis most directly models the binding constraint: Senate Majority Leader scheduling discretion is a discretionary property right with near-zero cost of inaction, and the filibuster threshold multiplies coalition assembly costs to a level that cannot be cleared in 14 days without executive branch cooperation. The Marxist framework confirms via intra-ruling-class fracture — Trump’s nationalist-extractive capital faction controls Republican party apparatus even where transnational capital’s material interests favor passage, producing structural deadlock that resolves slowly. The Austrian framework identifies scheduling control as information suppression: by refusing a floor vote, leadership prevents the preference revelation that would generate coordination pressure — the price signal never fires. The Keynesian paradox-of-thrift analogy captures the collective action failure: individually rational deferral by senators avoiding primary exposure produces collective inaction even when aggregate Senate will for Ukraine aid plausibly exists. Base rate for Senate passage within 14 days of leadership-opposed House passage is approximately 10-15% historically. Framework analysis provides modest positive updating (House defection scale, defense-industrial pressure) but the structural negatives (scheduling discretion, 60-vote threshold, Trump discipline) do not permit substantial upward revision. Weighted synthesis yields approximately 18% probability of passage by June 18 — framed as non-passage claim with 0.82 confidence.