Iran will not take any concrete operational threshold-crossing measure — formal closure announcement, naval blockade notice, mine-laying, or systematic maritime interdiction campaign — in or toward the Strait of Hormuz between June 2 and June 12, 2026. Sub-threshold gray-zone actions (tanker harassment, naval exercises, isolated vessel seizure as leverage) are the expected repertoire, but the stated threshold will not be crossed.

Four independent frameworks converge on the same operational conclusion despite divergent foundational assumptions — this cross-paradigm consensus is the primary confidence signal. The Marxist framework grounds no-action in class interest: IRGC self-preservation overrides ideological commitment because closure destroys the material base of the ruling bloc. The Austrian framework grounds it in option-value preservation: the threat extracts maximum rent without consuming the option, and IRGC economic apparatus is malinvested to the chronic-sanctions equilibrium, not to post-closure reconstruction. The Keynesian framework grounds it in demand-side income preservation: closure triggers a Minsky-style foreign-exchange collapse that the regime’s fiscal architecture cannot absorb within a 10-day window. The Institutionalist framework grounds it in path dependence: the 1988 precedent encoded a gray-zone-only repertoire in IRGC doctrine, and the veto-player structure (SNSC, IRGC, Supreme Leader, Foreign Ministry) creates collective-action dampening that systematically filters out threshold-crossing decisions. The primary discounts applied: (a) intra-IRGC factional dynamics — all four frameworks identify this as their primary blind spot and it cannot be modeled from available public information; (b) miscalculation/contact-incident escalation pathways that bypass political authorization circuits; (c) definitional ambiguity around ‘maritime interdiction’ — an isolated tanker seizure framed as collateral leverage might technically cross the threshold depending on scope. Base rate for threshold-crossing action in a 10-day window conditioning on explicit closure threat: approximately 10%, derived from the full historical record of Iranian Hormuz threat cycles (1982–2026) in which formal threshold-crossing occurred at most once (mine-laying during the 1988 hot war, context non-comparable). Framework evidence is uniformly in the no-action direction, warranting a 72-percentage-point upward adjustment in confidence in no-action over the base rate, yielding a final no-action probability of ~82%.