Iran will conduct at least one concrete physical action in or near the Strait of Hormuz — a formal naval exercise announcement, a documented IRGC vessel interception or boarding, or an officially announced transit monitoring or restriction — between June 1 and July 13, 2026.

All four frameworks converge on YES and on the same action-form (sub-closure: exercises, interceptions, harassment — not formal blockade). The convergence is unusually tight across analytically distinct traditions and functions as a high-confidence signal. The institutionalist framework provides the tightest causal handle: the IRGC path-dependent escalation repertoire activates when the diplomatic channel closes, because (a) the bureaucratic competition for Hormuz policy is now resolved in IRGC’s favor and (b) the institution’s deterrence credibility depreciates with each non-use cycle. The Marxist framework explains why the IRGC specifically prefers partial over terminal escalation: the confrontation-economy premium depends on maintaining sanctions-era spreads, which a catastrophic war would destroy. The Austrian framework adds that sanctions-induced calculation disorder makes US response thresholds opaque to Iranian planners, paradoxically increasing action probability by removing the feedback that would counsel restraint. The Keynesian Minsky mechanism explains timing pressure: the Hormuz threat’s bargaining value depreciates the longer it is held unused, creating urgency within the six-week window. The base rate of 0.72 is anchored on the 2019 Stena Impero precedent (structurally near-identical trigger: diplomatic collapse → maximum pressure → sub-closure physical action within weeks). Cross-framework convergence and the institutional mechanism’s precision raise this to 0.77. Confidence is held at medium because Khamenei’s personal risk calculus and US Fifth Fleet deterrence remain genuine constraints that no framework fully models.