By June 10, 2026, the US and Iran will either (a) formally announce or convene a fifth round of direct nuclear talks, OR (b) the US will publicly issue a formal negotiating deadline or ultimatum that converts the informal Oman channel into an explicit framework-demand process — at least one of these two events will occur.

Four structurally diverse frameworks all predict that SOME qualifying diplomatic output (fifth round OR ultimatum) is more likely than no output within 13 days — this convergence is the primary YES signal. The frameworks disagree specifically about WHICH pole is more probable: Marxist and Keynesian lean toward the ultimatum/coercive pole (US coalition constraints, bearish animal spirits, Minsky instability); Austrian and Institutionalist lean toward the fifth-round/continuation pole (price-discovery logic, path dependence, transaction cost asymmetry). Crucially, this intra-framework disagreement does not generate opposing predictions on the binary question — both poles resolve YES. The main NO scenario is complete diplomatic stasis in which neither side produces any qualifying signal within 13 days. This is disfavored by: (1) Iran’s acute economic pressure functioning as autonomous demand for output, (2) the existing Oman channel’s institutional cadence, (3) Trump’s deal-seeking self-image making a clean 13-day silence politically costly domestically. Base rate of 0.60 is drawn from comparable short-horizon diplomatic windows (2013 Geneva backchannel, post-Singapore US-DPRK interval) where some qualifying signal materialized within two weeks. Framework evidence adjusts upward to 0.65: Iran’s economic urgency and the dual-structure event space expansion push upward; IRGC capture, Israeli spoiler risk, and idiosyncrasy discount push slightly downward. Institutionalist receives highest weight because it generates the most specific, mechanistically grounded prediction about why the informal channel’s ambiguity is constitutively necessary — not just preferred — for both parties.