At least one additional UK ministerial departure (minister of state level or above) will occur, OR a formal no-confidence motion will be formally tabled in the House of Commons, before June 4, 2026.

All four frameworks converge on high probability of continued ministerial attrition, ranging from 0.68 (institutionalist) to 0.81 (Austrian). Cross-framework arithmetic average: 0.7625. The compound OR structure inflates this slightly because even a low-probability formal no-confidence motion adds positive probability mass to the YES outcome. Base rate for continued ministerial attrition in an active UK cabinet crisis (post-four-departure threshold) is estimated at 0.68 from historical comparanda. Framework evidence uniformly exceeds this base rate — the Minsky deterioration signal, the exit-price cascade, the class-contradiction amplifier, and the norm-erosion path dependence all point in the same direction. Upward adjustment from base rate to 0.82 is modest and reflects the 15-day constraint (shorter windows compress the exit opportunity) and the Reform UK floor effect that creates genuine suppression of individual departure calculus. The no-confidence motion strand contributes negligible additional probability given Labour’s majority and the procedural coordination required. The institutionalist institutional-decoupling insight is key: the two outcomes are gated by entirely different enforcement mechanisms — departure cascades are already flowing through one gate, while the no-confidence gate remains structurally locked. Confidence-in-confidence rated medium because the cascade’s timing distribution is uncertain: all frameworks predict continuation but cannot specify which individual actor crosses the threshold first within the 15-day window.