No direct Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting will take place, nor will confirmed dates for such a meeting be publicly announced by both parties, by 2026-06-21

All four frameworks converge on ‘no meeting’ within 6 weeks, though via distinct mechanisms. The Institutionalist framework provides the sharpest falsifiable constraint: the Ukrainian decree is a legal self-binding institution with real switching costs, not merely rhetorical position. The Keynesian framework identifies the operative dynamic most precisely: the signal-as-substitute mechanism, by which each exchange of diplomatic signals discharges enough pressure to prevent the accumulation of crisis-intensity that historically produces breakthroughs — the signals become the substitute for the meeting, not the precursor. The Marxist framework explains why the Russian side cannot credibly concede: the war-industrial class fraction with extraction interests in occupied territories constitutes a structural veto over any settlement terms a meeting could produce. The Austrian framework explains why exhaustion pressure has not materialized despite multi-year conflict: external subsidies (Western transfers, Russian state mobilization) keep both sides’ reservation values artificially elevated, deferring the Austrian correction that would otherwise force price discovery. Base rate for confirmed bilateral meeting within 6 weeks of a signal in an active hot war context is approximately 10-15% from historical precedents. All four frameworks push below this base rate. The residual 17% probability reflects: (1) Trump administration coercive capacity operating outside normal institutional logics; (2) the possibility of a symbolic meeting explicitly framed as non-substantive that threads the decree; (3) rapid decree reversal under US pressure that all frameworks acknowledge remains structurally possible even if unlikely in the window.