The Malian transitional government will NOT formally declare a national state of emergency AND will NOT publicly request emergency military reinforcement from any external partner (Russia/Africa Corps successor, neighboring state, or the African Union) within 60 days of the late-April 2026 coordinated attacks.

Three of four frameworks converge on NO through distinct, non-redundant mechanisms: (1) Marxist: sovereignty-ideology as legitimacy currency — formal emergency declaration makes the Africa Corps dependency legible, destroying the ideological naturalization that sustains junta cohesion; the existing arrangement already functions as permanent de facto emergency, making a new public request redundant as well as costly; (2) Austrian: political entrepreneurship favors face-preserving informal contract expansion when it achieves identical operational outcomes — the knowledge-problem argument is secondary but reinforces that the junta’s concentrated-force model will continue to produce exploitable gaps regardless of formal declaration; (3) Institutionalist: path-dependent inertia around the sovereignty-performance norm — three years of accumulated institutional investment in a specific legitimacy grammar has no dignified slot for public emergency acknowledgment; AU/ECOWAS channels are structurally blocked by prior institutional rupture, eliminating two of the three external-partner YES pathways entirely. The Keynesian framework dissents credibly through the fiscal-capacity trap: CFA franc constraints mean external military transfer is the only structural substitute for domestic demand stabilization, and the security-economy vicious cycle (attacks erode confidence → capital flight → revenue contraction → security capacity contraction) has no sustainable equilibrium of visible inaction. However, the Keynesian prescription — external reinforcement as demand-stabilizing signal — is precisely what the informal Africa Corps contract already delivers operationally without the formal emergency grammar. The question asks about publicly acknowledged formal or emergency requests; the informal channel achieves the same functional outcome while preserving the sovereignty narrative. Historical base rate from comparable Sahel junta configurations (CAR, Burkina Faso): approximately 22% probability of YES (formal declaration or public reinforcement request) over 60-day crisis horizons. Three-framework convergence on NO through independent mechanisms and strong CAR template support adjust confidence to 65% NO (35% YES). The Keynesian dissent, Bamako proximity, and the OR condition’s breadth prevent higher confidence — 35% YES is non-trivial and reflects genuine structural uncertainty about whether informal channels can absorb an attack of this severity.