By May 22, 2026, neither qualifying formal response will materialize: Beijing will not issue a state-level formal policy statement explicitly upgrading cross-strait engagement terms, and the DPP will not formally prohibit or legally constrain opposition cross-strait diplomatic contact through legislation or enforceable executive order.

Three of four frameworks (Austrian, Institutionalist, and Keynesian cost-gradient analysis) converge on institutional inertia as the dominant force: formal moves carry prohibitive switching costs for both actors. The decisive structural constraint is supplied by the Institutionalist framework: DPP cannot pass legislation (legislative minority in the Yuan) and executive prohibition immediately faces constitutional challenge — so even if Marxist intent-logic is correct, DPP institutional capacity is substantially weaker than Marxist analysis assumes. The 2005 Lien Chan precedent, cited independently by Austrian and Institutionalist analyses from different theoretical premises, provides the strongest historical base rate: similar conditions produced neither formal response within six weeks or beyond. The Marxist prediction of ~60% DPP action is discounted because it models motivation without modeling institutional constraint. The Keynesian engagement-signal argument for Beijing is partially valid but conflates rhetorical gesture (probable) with formal policy upgrade (improbable within the six-week window, given CPC coordination costs). Weighted synthesis yields approximately 32–34% probability that at least one formal threshold is crossed — the prediction therefore claims the more probable outcome: neither formal action by May 22.