Commercial tanker passage through the Strait of Hormuz will recover to at least 60% of pre-conflict baseline traffic volumes by April 24, 2026, following ceasefire diplomacy.

All four frameworks converge independently on NO with confidence 0.72-0.78, a rare cross-framework consensus that functions as a strong signal. Each framework identifies structurally distinct but mutually reinforcing mechanisms: (1) Marxist — the passage-fee dispute expresses an irresolvable base contradiction between US imperial rent extraction and Iranian state-capitalist sovereignty reproduction, preventing the diplomatic settlement needed to unlock insurance repricing; (2) Austrian — epistemic cascade dynamics in dispersed price-signal markets mean even genuine security improvement takes 2-4 weeks to propagate through underwriters to operator decisions, and sunk-cost path dependence in Cape rerouting creates independent switching-cost friction; (3) Keynesian — Minsky confidence-stock destruction is asymmetric (years to accumulate, days to destroy, weeks to partially restore), and the collective coordination failure is an effective demand gap that persists as long as animal spirits remain depressed below the industry convention-shift threshold; (4) Institutionalist — the Ostrom governance vacuum (no credible monitoring, no sanctioning mechanism, no legitimate rule structure recognized by all actors) means the common-pool passage regime does not exist in operable form, and contested property rights from the fee claim suppress volumes through an additional channel. Historical base rate for 60% recovery within 14 days of a fragile ceasefire: approximately 7% (1988 Tanker War required 4-6 months; Red Sea/Houthi required quarters). Upward adjustments for commodity price pressure, Gulf state bilateral guarantees, and state-backed tanker fleet partial override bring YES confidence to approximately 10%. Final estimate: 90% probability this claim is FALSE.