At least one unannounced tariff measure — executive order imposing new duties, retaliatory product list expansion, or formal suspension of a trade exemption — will be publicly announced by either the US or China between April 10–24, 2026, without having been publicly pre-signaled before April 10.

All four frameworks independently converge on YES with confidences of 0.79–0.82. The historical base rate during active escalation phases (~0.87 for any 14-day window containing an unannounced move) anchors the estimate. The institutionalist analysis provides the most direct mechanism: near-zero transaction cost of executive action plus WTO governance vacuum plus embedded tit-for-tat norm means that a 14-day pause without new action is the anomaly requiring explanation, not the move itself. The Marxist and Austrian frameworks supply reinforcing pipeline mechanisms (coalition maintenance, rent-seeking processing) that ensure the pipeline of candidate actions is continuously stocked. The Keynesian Minsky reading adds a second-order amplifier: if negotiation calm preceded April 10, that stability itself creates the trigger for a surprise move. The primary downside risk — a bilateral diplomatic freeze — is real but would require coordinated restraint from both sides simultaneously, which the tit-for-tat norm makes structurally improbable. Net confidence: 0.85, modestly below the simple framework average (0.81) and base rate (0.87) because the diplomatic freeze risk is non-trivial and the falsification criteria require specifically unannounced action (pre-announced escalation, even if Trump telegraphs it via social media in a way that qualifies as pre-announcement, would not count).