By June 1, 2026, the US-Iran diplomatic process will remain in purely renewable mode: no formal framework agreement, no sanctions relief roadmap, and no enrichment suspension protocol with binding verification architecture will have been produced. The process will generate at least two additional ceasefire extensions and at least one 'framework for talks' or 'principles' communiqué, each of which will itself be a renewable rather than stock instrument.

Base rate for producing a genuine stock instrument within eight weeks of talks initiation — across comparable cases (P5+1 2006-2013, Six-Party Talks 2003-2009, US-DPRK 1994) — is approximately 15%. The institutional structure is the decisive driver: statutory sanctions constraints and IRGC veto together mean neither executive can alienate reversibility without domestic institutional support it does not possess. The Institutionalist and Marxist frameworks are most directly explanatory here, collectively predicting renewable mode with ~0.78 confidence. The Keynesian counter-scenario (economic pain threshold forcing coordination) is real but requires sustained Hormuz closure of sufficient duration to cross the demand-crisis threshold in both economies simultaneously — a compound event with probability under 20% in the available window. The Austrian framework adds the credibility-depletion mechanism as a structural amplifier of Iranian risk premium, making the counter-scenario even less likely. Adjusting the 15% base rate upward slightly to reflect genuine Hormuz disruption pressure (and Trump’s deal-making incentive) yields approximately 20-25% probability of a stock instrument. Inverting: 75-80% probability of remaining in renewable mode. Splitting the difference across framework weights gives 0.76 confidence in the renewable-mode prediction.