Tanker transit volume through the Strait of Hormuz will remain at least 40% below pre-conflict baseline through June 30, 2026, with durable rerouting of Gulf crude exports toward alternative corridors (Saudi East-West Pipeline, UAE Fujairah) becoming structurally embedded regardless of formal closure status.

Four frameworks independently converge on the same directional prediction through distinct mechanisms: Marxist through chokepoint-rent incentive structure making unconditional reopening irrational for Iran; Austrian through physical capacity constraints binding faster than price signals can dissolve within 3.5 months; Keynesian through investment-uncertainty paralysis under fundamental unknowability of conflict duration; Institutionalist through path-dependent infrastructure ceilings and insurance market inertia. Cross-framework convergence elevates confidence above any single-framework estimate. The key uncertainty — identified uniquely by the institutionalist analysis — is Iran’s selective-passage bilateral institution: whether China and India secure sufficient volume access to push aggregate transit above the 40% reduction threshold. This single variable accounts for most remaining probability against the prediction. Historical base rate from analogous maritime closure episodes (Suez 1967-75 closure, Tanker War 1984-88) suggests major disruptions exceeding 3-month durations are common, supporting a ~65% base rate; specific structural factors here — US as active belligerent rather than neutral enforcer, no alternative corridor capable of substituting full Hormuz volume, Iran’s demonstrated capacity to maintain selective closure indefinitely — justify upward adjustment to 0.73.